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Abstract
Safety management systems (SMS) are becoming the industry standard for safety management throughout the aviation industry. As the
Federal Aviation Administration continues to mandate SMS for different segments, the assessment of an organization’s safety culture
becomes more important. An SMS can facilitate the development of a strong aviation safety culture. This study describes how safety
culture and SMS are integrated.
The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between an organization’s safety culture and SMS implementation in
collegiate flight schools. The research study was designed to determine (a) the relationship between SMS implementation and safety
culture, (b) the relationship between safety promotion and safety culture, and (c) the relationship between management commitment and
safety culture. The study population consisted of 453 students and employees from 13 collegiate flight schools. Data were gathered
through an online survey at collegiate flight schools within the University Aviation Association utilizing the Collegiate Aviation Program
Safety Culture Survey (CAPSCUS) to measure the safety culture at those collegiate flight schools.
The results indicated that a relationship existed between SMS implementation and safety culture, safety promotion and safety culture,
management commitment and safety culture. The relationship for all three was more prominent within the Formal Safety Program major
scale of the CAPSCUS.
Keywords: SMS, safety culture, collegiate flight schools

Introduction
An integral aspect of a safely management system (SMS) is a positive safety culture. The Chernobyl accident was the
first in which a failed safety culture was cited as a contributory factor following the investigation of the accident. Even
before Chernobyl, the concept that an organization’s attitudes and beliefs established its policies and procedures and that
those attitudes and beliefs affected the organization’s safety performance was an accepted theory. This belief existed even as far
back as 1930 (Ostrom, Wilhelmsen, & Kaplan, 1993). An organization cannot have a successful SMS without this strong
safety culture and invariably a strong safety culture helps in the development of an SMS (Stolzer, Goglia, & Halford, 2011).
SMS provides a framework for an organization to manage safety and serves as a structure to build a positive safety culture (von
Thaden & Gibbons, 2008). According to AC 120-92A (Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], 2010), ‘‘an organization’s
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culture consists of its values, beliefs, legends, rituals, mission
goals, performance measures, and sense of responsibility
to its employees, customers, and the community’’ (p. 3). It is
important to note that an ‘‘SMS was not designed to create a
‘culture of safety,’ an SMS was designed to build upon and
improve an existing ‘culture of safety’’’ (Garcia & Boyer,
n.d., p. 2).
Reason (1997) described a positive safety culture as one
that demonstrates competence, the ability to gather and disseminate safety information; commitment, which is the motivation and resources to pursue safety goals; and cognizance,
which is an awareness of the risk factors. Palframan (1994)
also focused on the involvement of all personnel in promoting safety, commitment to safety from senior management,
and not appointing blame and lessons learned from accidents
and incidents. Pidgeon (1991) described a healthy safety
culture as having well-developed norms and rules to promote safety, an informed and healthy attitude toward risk,
and mechanisms to provide feedback concerning safety
performance.
The safety health of an organization is generally based
on two key factors: competence and commitment. Competence is the quality of the organization’s safety systems
and processes. Competence refers to the SMS. The second
feature is commitment. Commitment refers to how safety
is valued and managed by people in the organization,
which includes beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors; in other
words, safety culture (Wang, 2011). The link between
the competence–SMS and commitment–safety culture often
characterizes the way people within an organization behave,
and is referred to as behavioral norms. The nature by which
safety within an organization is managed is influenced by the
culture of the organization. If an organization has a welldeveloped SMS and a strong safety culture, the organization
will then achieve a level of safety that reduces hazards as
much as practicable (Wang, 2011). For commitment and
competence to remain strong within an organization, senior
management has to remain committed towards making safety
a priority (Wang, 2011).
A strong tie exists between organizational accidents and
a failed safety culture. Measuring safety culture is a key
aspect within an SMS and continuous improvement. Many
studies have assessed safety culture in a variety of organizations (Cox & Flin, 1998; Freiwald, Lenz-Anderson, &
Baker, 2013; Gill, 2004; Hanks, 2011; Lee & Weitzel,
2005; McNeely, 2012; Pidgeon, 1998). However, few
studies exist addressing the relationship between SMS
implementation and its impact on developing a strong
safety culture (McNeely, 2012). Few studies have been
conducted that have attempted to identify if there is a
relationship between SMS implementation and safety
culture in collegiate flight schools (Robertson, 2016). The
purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between
SMS implementation and safety culture at collegiate flight
schools.

3

Research Questions
The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between SMS implementation and safety culture at
collegiate flight schools. The research questions used to
examine this relationship include the following:
1. What is the relationship between SMS implementation and safety culture at collegiate flight schools?
2. What is the relationship between the level of promotion and the safety culture at collegiate flight schools?
3. What is the relationship between the level of management commitment and safety culture at collegiate
flight schools?
Background
All four components of SMS must exist and be executed for an effective SMS to exist within an organization.
A strong safety culture is an integral part of SMS.
Some of the key characteristics of SMS that are reflected in the framework developed by ICAO are that it is:
a dynamic risk management system; it is based on quality
management system (QMS) principles; it exists in a
structure scaled appropriately to the operational risk; and
it is applied in a safety culture environment. (Stolzer
et al., 2015, p. 35)
As early as 1996, Horbury identified that the goal of an
SMS is the development of a safety culture. SMS will only
work if individuals within an organization are motivated
to conform and comply with the organization’s desire
(Horbury, 1996). For organizations to be safe and to have a
good safety culture, it is important for structures to be in
place to enhance organizational learning (Horbury, 1996).
Cooper (1998) noted that
the situational aspects of safety culture tend to be reflected in organizational policies, operating procedures,
management systems, control systems, communication
flows and workflow systems as well as factors such as
noise, heat, light, and physical proximity associated with
the immediate working environment. As such, this wide
range of cultural influences should be measured via
audits of Safety Management Systems. (p. 10)
An organization cannot have a successful SMS without
this strong safety culture; and invariably a strong safety
culture helps in the development of an SMS (Stolzer et al.,
2011). A safety culture can be challenging to define. This
difficulty occurs because each organization is unique. Many
different features or aspects can influence safety culture. The
nation or region where the organization is located, technology, as well as successes and failures of the organization
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are all factors affecting safety culture (Ostrom et al., 1993).
The FAA (2015b) described components of safety culture as
‘‘psychological (how people think and feel), behavioral (how
people and groups act and perform), and organizational or
systematic (the programs, procedures, and organization of
the enterprise) elements’’ (p. 3). The importance of safety
culture is underscored further by the FAA’s guidance in AC
120-92B (2015b), which stated the following:
One key aspect that is essential to safety performance is
the culture of an organization. ‘‘Safety Culture’’ is the
term that we apply those aspects of the organization’s
culture that relate to safety performance. The concept of
safety culture underlies safety management and is the
basis for the SMS requirement. (p. 3)
It is recommended that in order to improve an organization’s safety culture, the safety culture needs to be
defined. After the culture is developed, an SMS is then
ready to be established. The first and most important step
in establishing an SMS is to measure the existing safety
culture (Garcia & Boyer, n.d.).
Remember that an SMS is a system, not a program, and
is based on a ‘‘culture of safety.’’ It was not designed to
create a ‘‘culture of safety.’’ It was designed to build
upon and improve an existing ‘‘culture of safety.’’ By
defining your existing safety culture first and then nurturing that culture to an appropriate level, your department
will reap the rewards of operational excellence and
effectively and proactively control your hazards through a
successfully implemented SMS. (Garcia & Boyer, n.d., p. 5)
Within the aviation industry, there are many organizations that continuously strive to improve their SMS, or
other safety program, by assessing their current safety
culture (Freiwald et al., 2013; Gill, 2004; Hanks, 2011; Lee
& Weitzel, 2005). Whether an organization has a traditional
safety program or an SMS, it is widely recognized throughout the aviation industry that an SMS facilitates a
positive safety culture. In 2010, Ireland utilized a safety
culture survey to measure the safety culture in the aviation
industry. The aviation industry consisted of just over
11,000 employees. Over 1,000 people submitted a survey,
which was more than what was expected. The survey
revealed that the respondents had a strong knowledge of
SMS as well as a positive safety culture throughout the
industry (Ireland Aviation Authority, 2011).
Adjekum (2013) conducted an assessment of safety culture at an accredited four-year collegiate aviation program.
The population of this study was students, including a large
international population and flight instructors. The purpose
of the study was to assess the perception of safety culture
between the different groups within the population. A further goal of the study was ‘‘to establish a safety culture

assessment methodology, which could be replicated in
other similar collegiate aviation programs for comparison
results and ultimately the continuous improvement of
collegiate aviation safety’’ (Adjekum, 2013, p. 6).
Adjekum found that the longer a participant had been in
the organization, the better the perception they had concerning safety culture. Overall there was a positive perception of safety culture throughout the study. However,
there was a significant difference in perceptions of safety
culture between international students and American students. International students’ perceptions of safety culture
were less favorable than those of the American students
(Adjekum, 2013). The study recommended changes to the
international program to take the effect of national culture
on safety culture into consideration.
As a result of that study, Adjekum (2013) had several
recommendations for further study. The author recommended that a future assessment of management on the
safety culture of an organization correlated with student
perceptions could help gauge the extent of SMS saturation.
Further studies similar to this should be conducted at other
universities. The results of these studies could be crossvalidated to build a usable database for predictive safety
studies. This could help provide a baseline for the development, implementation, and continuous improvement of
SMS in collegiate aviation programs (Adjekum, 2013).
Similar to Adjekum (2013), Adjekum et al. (2015) conducted a study utilizing a modified version of the Collegiate Aviation Program Safety Culture Survey (CAPSCUS)
referred to as the Collegiate Aviation Perception of Safety
Culture Assessment Survey (CAPSCAS) to help further
validate the instrument. The purpose of the study was to
investigate how safety culture perceptions of the respondents
influenced their safety reporting behavior. Participants were
recruited from five collegiate aviation programs. One of the
main objectives of the study was to determine safety culture
perception variables that would predict safety reporting
behavior and if there was a significant difference of safety
reporting behavior among basic demographic variables. The
CAPSCAS utilizes six primary dimensions with 69 items
with subscales for each dimension. The primary dimensions
include the following: Operations Interactions (OI), Formal
Safety (FS), Informal Safety (IS), Aviation Department
Safety Record (ADSR), Organizational Commitment (OC),
and Safety Behavior (SB). Those main dimensions have
subscales (Adjekum et al., 2015). This was a departure from
the original CAPSCUS, which utilized the above dimensions
without ADSR and SB.
This study utilized the survey items within the CAPSCAS
from the subscales from the Reporting System dimension.
A cross-sectional quasi-mixed methods approach was utilized
to determine the relationship between safety culture and
safety reporting. Demographic data were analyzed as well
as qualitative methods being used for data collection. The
findings from the study suggested that when management of
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collegiate aviation programs provides effective feedback on
safety issues, a positive perception of safety culture increases
within the organization. The authors also concluded that it is
important to have a healthy safety foundation and framework
within collegiate aviation programs.
The results of this study were similar to those of
Friewald et al. (2011), which suggested that generally the
respondents thought that safety reporting systems were
important but they did not participate in the safety reporting
system at their organization. Adjekum et al. (2015) noted
that, ‘‘When respondents operate in a proactive safety
environment and feel that safety concerns are adequately
and expeditiously addressed, respondents may develop a
positive perception of the prevalent safety in the program’’
(p. 16).
The researchers recommended that safety awareness and
safety reporting programs are extended to all stakeholders
within an organization. Furthermore, like Adjekum (2013),
the authors recommended future studies to be conducted to
further validate assessments like the CAPSCUS/CAPSCAS.
Finally, they recommended safety culture studies comparing safety culture perceptions for various demographic
groups such as managers, employees, or students should be
conducted.
In 2016, Robertson (2016) conducted a qualitative study
to investigate the relationship between SMS elements and
process and safety culture in collegiate flight training institutions. The author interviewed five safety professionals
at various flight training institutions around the country
utilizing a semi-structured interview. Of the five institutions
interviewed, only two had a fully developed and implemented SMS. One of the findings was that it was considered among all the participants that a confidential hazard
reporting system was one of the most important aspects
in building a strong safety culture. Other elements of
SMS that contributed were a strong training program and
the SRM five-step processes. Robertson (2016) recommended that both quantitative and qualitative studies
continue to examine the relationship between SMS and
safety culture.
Methods and Procedures
The study participants include management, employees,
and students from collegiate flight schools who are members of the University Aviation Association. The sampling
design for this study is a non-probability convenience
sampling technique. This study builds from a previous
study by Robertson, Romero, and Goetz that investigated
the status of SMS in collegiate flight schools. Thirteen of
those schools that participated in that study consented to be
surveyed for this study. The study population consisted of
453 individuals from those schools to assess the safety
culture within the organizations. The CAPSCUS was
utilized to assess the safety culture at each institution.
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The CAPSCUS was emailed to the safety officers of
participating institutions for dissemination to students, faculty, and staff. If participants did not respond, a follow-up
request was sent one more time within two weeks after the
initial survey. Participants had the opportunity to opt out of
the study and to not receive any future emails. Each
participant was emailed a letter stating the purpose of the
study and told that the study was strictly voluntary, and that
all information would be kept confidential.
Collegiate Aviation Program Safety Culture Survey
The survey used was the CAPSCUS (Adjekum, 2013),
which was derived from the Commercial Aviation Safety
Survey (CASS). The CASS was designed as a means to
measure the overall safety culture of an airline. The CASS
measures five organizational indicators of safety culture.
The indicators were defined and synthesized from common
themes in safety culture researched previously by Wiegmann,
Zhang, von Thaden, Sharma, and Gibbons (2004). Also,
Ostrom et al. (1993) stated, ‘‘A properly structured survey
instrument has been shown to be a very effective tool for
assessing safety culture in organizations’’ (p. 169).
The five-factor model of CASS includes organizational
commitment, management involvement, pilot empowerment, reporting systems, and accountability systems as they
relate to safety within an airline. The survey is comprised
of 84 items that occur in random order throughout the
instrument. The items include an accountability system
(n 5 10), management involvement (n 5 17), organizational
commitment (n 5 30), pilot empowerment (n 5 14), and
reporting system (n 5 13). The instrument utilizes a 7-point
Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (neither
agree nor disagree) and to 7 (strongly agree), with only those
three points labeled (Gibbons, von Thaden, & Wiegmann,
2005). A later version of the instrument moved from this
7-point scale to a 5-point Likert scale due to negative
participant response given the high number of items on the
instrument.
Gibbons et al. (2005) continued research to validate the
CASS by utilizing the survey to assess safety culture in
airline maintenance operations. The maintenance version of
the survey was designed with the same structure as the
version for flight operations. This survey applied to the five
indicators of safety culture previously mentioned. Results
of a factor analysis supported three of the factors which
included an accountability system, reporting system, and
management/supervisory involvement. Organizational commitment and employee empowerment did not result in a
good fit to the data. These findings were consistent with the
flight operations version of the survey. The authors recognized that the instrument seems useful in identifying
strengths and weaknesses of airline maintenance safety
culture. However, they also recognized that more modification is necessary to the instrument for future research.
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Adjekum (2013) and Freiwald et al. (2013) conducted
studies that utilized an adaptation of the CASS to flight
training organizations. Adjekum (2013) had the adaptation approved by von Thaden (2012) and Creswell (2009).
The CASS was adapted to the CAPSCUS. Adjekum
(2013) conducted a factor analysis in the form of a
principal component analysis on the modified questions
to check for content validity. A reliability check for
all scales was conducted using the Cronbach alpha
coefficient.
The CAPSCUS utilizes four major factor scales which
include Formal Safety Program, Informal Safety Program,
Operations Interaction, and Organizational Commitment.
The CAPSCUS also includes a Safety Behavior Scale that
includes perceptions of personal and organizational risk.
The CAPSCUS also has multiple subfactor scales (Adjekum,
2013). Table 1 outlines the major scales and subscales of the
CAPSCUS.
Data Analysis
The study made use of a non-experimental comparative research design. The purpose of the study was to
investigate the relationship between SMS implementation,
management commitment, and promotion and the safety
culture of the flight training organizations. The SMS implementation, management commitment, and promotion were
the independent variables, and the CAPSCUS was the
instrument used to measure the safety culture, which is the
dependent variable.
The data from the CAPSCUS violated the assumption of
normality and homogeneity, as it did not form a normal
distribution. Because of this, non-parametric tests were
chosen. A Cronbach alpha coefficient was accomplished on
the CAPSCUS data to determine reliability. Further data

Table 1
Scales inventory for the CAPSCUS as modified from the CASS
(Adjekum, 2013).
CAPSCUS Major Factor Scales Subfactor Scales
Formal Safety Program

Informal Safety Program

Operations Interaction

Organizational Commitment

Safety Behavior

Reporting System
Response and Feedback
Safety Personnel
Accountability
Pilot Authority
Professionalism
Supervisor of Flight/Chief Flight
Instructor
Dispatch
Instructors
Ground and Ramp Personnel
Safety Values
Safety Fundamentals
Going Beyond Compliance
Personal Risk
Organizational Risk

analysis was accomplished using descriptive statistics and
the Spearman r for correlation between the schools and the
subscales. Finally, the Spearman r was used to find the
correlation between SMS implementation, safety promotion, and management commitment with safety culture subscales. Quantitative data were imported into the Statistics
Program for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 22 and analyzed. Statistically significant values were set at the 0.05
levels.
Demographics
Thirteen schools participated in the second phase of this
study and agreed to forward the CAPSCUS to individuals
within their institution. Each school was given a reference
number. Three schools (6, 8, and 18) chose not to forward
the CAPSCUS to students and sent it only to the faculty
and flight instructors. One school (5) chose only to forward it to the students. The first question asked on the
CAPSCUS was to name the institution. Because each
institution received its own version of the CAPSCUS, this
created redundancy to match individuals to the correct
school. Basic demographics included the primary responsibility of the respondent within the flight training institution (see Table 2).
Most of the respondents (91%, 419) reported that they
had associated with their school for less than five years.
The majority of respondents (76%) reported that they
were under the age of 30 (students). Respondents were also
asked to report the number of times they had reported a
safety problem at their college/university within the last
year. The majority of the respondents had not submitted a
report within the last year (67.5%).
Finally, the respondents were asked their gender. Most
of the participants, 396 (87%), were male. The rest were
female with one respondent selecting other. Two other
demographic questions were asked, including certificates
and ratings and academic group for students. The information gathered from these questions was not used for the
purposes of this study, but the questions were asked to
prepare a follow-up study concerning those groups. All of
the schools except for five within this study have some
aspects of SMS under development. Those schools that do
not have SMS under development are schools 3, 5, 6, 18,
and 21. However, they did report that they had some SMS
elements and processes.
Reliability
Reliability of the CAPSCUS responses was checked
using the Cronbach’s alpha for all four major scales (Formal
Safety, Informal Safety, Operational Interaction, and Organizational Commitment). All four major scales and Safety
Behavior revealed high reliabilities. All of the subscales were
checked as well, and also displayed high consistencies.
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Table 2
Primary responsibility of respondents by collegiate flight school.
Primary Responsibility

Flight Instructor
Assistant Chief
Faculty
Safety Department
Administration
Admin Staff
Line Service
Maintenance
Dispatch
Student
Other
Total

School Reference Number
1

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

15

18

20

21

3
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
4
0
9

27
3
2
0
5
6
0
15
3
3
4
68

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
9
1
10

2
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4

0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
18
0
19

4
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
7

8
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
23
1
33

12
5
2
0
1
1
2
2
4
81
0
110

1
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
4
0
7

5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
19
0
25

7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7

22
0
1
1
1
0
3
3
2
106
2
141

5
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
5
1
13

Table 3
Cronbach’s alpha for major factor scales and subfactor scales.
CAPSCUS Major Factor Scales

Cronbach’s a

Formal Safety Program (15)

0.912

Informal Safety Program (14)

0.912

Operations Interaction (19)

0.925

Organizational Commitment (15)

0.923

Safety Behavior (14)

0.926

Subfactor Scales
Reporting System (5)
Response and Feedback (5)
Safety Personnel (5)
Accountability (4)
Pilot Authority (5)
Professionalism (5)
Supervisor of Flight/Chief Flight Instructor (5)
Dispatch (4)
Instructors (4)
Ground and Ramp Personnel (6)
Safety Values (5)
Safety Fundamentals (6)
Going Beyond Compliance (4)
Personal Risk (7)
Organizational Risk (7)

Cronbach’s a
0.830
0.785
0.842
0.826
0.812
0.772
0.783
0.792
0.842
0.893
0.853
0.881
0.788
0.834
0.914

Note. Values in parentheses denote number of items in each scale.

The values for reliabilities for the major scales and subscales are outlined in Table 3.
Subscale Descriptive
There were 453 surveys filled out from the 13 schools.
As mentioned previously, the CAPSCUS is comprised
of 13 subscales with the addition of Safety Behavior.
Aggregate scores from each survey were totaled for each
subscale and for Safety Behavior. Safety Behavior was
treated as a subscale, due to it not being a true major scale.
Tests for normality were conducted on each subscale for
every school. The data in every subscale violated the
assumption of normality and homogeneity. Table 4 displays the descriptive statistics for each subscale. Missing
values vary for each subscale. There are two reasons for
this. The first is that several respondents chose not to
answer questions within a subscale or did not answer the
subscale because it did not apply to them within their job.
For example, the safety behavior scale asked several
questions that related more to pilots. The second is that

there were many respondents that stopped the survey at
various places within the instrument. All responses were
left in the survey no matter where they elected to stop.
However, the missing data in the subscale totals were not
used in the data analysis calculations.
Data Analysis
A school-by-school analysis was completed to determine
what SMS elements and processes each school had by SMS
component. There are four components of SMS: Safety
Policy, Safety Risk Management, Safety Assurance, and
Safety Promotion. Each school was given a value based on
the number of processes and elements that they had within
each component. For example, if a school had seven of the
nine elements within Safety Promotion, they were given a
score of seven. This process was accomplished for every
school for every component as well as an overall SMS
implementation score based on a total of 30 elements and
processes. Tables 5–8 display the elements and processes
for each component and school-by-school comparison.
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Table 4
Descriptive statistics for CAPSCUS subscales.
CAPSCUS Subscale
Reporting System
Response and Feedback
Safety Personnel
Accountability
Pilot Authority
Professionalism
Supervisor of Flight/Chief Flight Instructor
Dispatch
Instructors
Ground and Ramp Personnel
Safety Values
Safety Fundamentals
Going Beyond Compliance
Safety Behavior

N

Missing

Mean

Median

a

426
421
409
409
401
390
389
385
390
384
391
387
384
370

27
32
34
44
52
63
64
68
63
69
62
66
69
83

18.15
18.28
19.83
14.10
16.89
15.78
17.70
13.94
16.50
22.98
19.57
24.35
15.36
31.64

19.00
19.00
20.00
15.00
17.00
16.00
18.00
15.00
17.00
24.00
20.00
25.00
16.00
33.00

4.25
4.23
3.95
3.60
4.35
3.28
3.54
4.12
2.90
5.27
4.05
4.83
3.08
9.14

Table 5
Safety policy (planning and organization).
Element/Process

Completed Gap Analysis
Implementation Plan
Safety Policy Statement
SMS Objectives
Identified Accountable Executive
Identified SMS Manager/Coordinator
Identified Safety Committee
Emergency Planning and Response

School Reference Numbers
20

15

7

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

10
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

11

9

8

X
X
X

X
X
X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

5

1

X
X
X
X

X

X

21

6

18

X

X

X

X

3

X

X
X
X
X

X

X

X

18

3

21

X
X

X

Table 6
Safety risk management.
Element/Process

Hazard Identification
Hazard Tracking and Documentation
Risk Analysis
Established 5-Step SRM Process
Conducted Safety Risk Assessments

School Reference Numbers
20

7

10

8

11

5

15

9

1

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X

6

X

X
X

X

X

Table 7
Safety assurance, continuous improvement.
Element/Process

Confidential Hazard Reporting: Paper
Confidential Hazard Reporting: Web
Trend Analysis
Safety Performance Monitoring
Continuous Monitoring of Controls
Flight Data Monitoring Analysis
SMS Audits or Evaluations
Safety Culture Assessments

School Reference Numbers
20

15

10

9

8

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X

1
X
X

7

18

X
X

X
X
X

X
X

5

11

6

X

X

X

X

3

X
X

X
X

21

X

X

X
X
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Table 8
Safety promotion.
Element/Process

Specialized SMS Training
SMS Training for Employees
SMS Training for Students
Safety Bulletin Boards
Safety Newsletters
Employee Safety Meetings
Student Safety Meetings
Safety Awards Program
Safety Stand Downs

School Reference Numbers
20

7

8

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

10

18

9

1

15

6

11

5

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X

3

21

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X

X

Figure 1. Total SMS implementation by school reference number.

The total SMS implementation was also conducted.
There were 30 elements and processes. Only one school
(20) had all of the items for total SMS implementation.
Figure 1 displays the total SMS elements and processes for
each school.
To determine if there was a relationship in SMS implementation and safety culture, a Spearman r correlation was
conducted. The correlation was conducted based on the
elements and processes within each school as previously
described for each component and the CAPSCUS subscales. Tables 9–13 display the Spearman r for each SMS
component and overall SMS implementation.
There were weak positive and negative correlations
between the level of SMS Policy and the subscale variables.
Five variables were found to be statistically significant:
Reporting System, rs 5 0.121, p 5 0.013; Response and
Feedback, rs 5 0.211, p 5 0.000; Safety Personnel, rs 5
0.221, p 5 0.000; Dispatch, rs 5 0.258, p 5 0.000; and
Safety Fundamentals, rs 5 0.247, p 5 0.000.
Within the Safety Risk Management component, there
were five variables found to be statistically significant:
Response and Feedback, rs 5 0.162, p 5 0.001; Safety
Personnel, rs 5 0.208, p 5 0.000; Accountability, rs 5
0.109, p 5 0.028; Dispatch, rs 5 0.132, p 5 0.010; and
Safety Fundamentals, rs 5 0.146, p 5 0.004.

Table 9
Safety Policy Spearman r correlation coefficient.
CAPSCUS Subscale
Reporting System
Response and Feedback
Safety Personnel
Accountability
Pilot Authority
Professionalism
Supervisor of Flight/Chief Flight Instructor
Dispatch
Instructors
Ground and Ramp Personnel
Safety Values
Safety Fundamentals
Going Beyond Compliance
Safety Behavior

Spearman r

Sig.

0.121*
0.211**
0.221**
0.092
20.040
20.085
0.063
0.258**
0.079
0.027
20.037
0.247**
20.013
20.070

0.013
0.000
0.000
0.063
0.428
0.094
0.214
0.000
0.121
0.605
0.461
0.000
0.800
0.178

Note. **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; *correlation is significant
at the 0.05 level.

Within the Safety Assurance component, there were seven
variables found to be statistically significant: Reporting
System, rs 5 0.162, p 5 0.001; Response and Feedback,
rs 5 0.221, p 5 0.000; Safety Personnel, rs 5 0.226, p 5
0.000; Accountability, rs 5 0.170, p 5 0.001; Dispatch, rs 5
0.216, p 5 0.000; Instructors, rs 5 0.100, p 5 0.049; and
Safety Fundamentals, rs 5 0.345, p 5 0.000.
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Table 10
Safety Risk Management Spearman r correlation coefficient.
CAPSCUS Subscale

Table 12
Safety Promotion Spearman r correlation coefficient.

Spearman r Sig.

Reporting System
Response and Feedback
Safety Personnel
Accountability
Pilot Authority
Professionalism
Supervisor of Flight/Chief Flight Instructor
Dispatch
Instructors
Ground and Ramp Personnel
Safety Values
Safety Fundamentals
Going Beyond Compliance
Safety Behavior

0.043
0.162**
0.208**
0.109*
20.014
20.130
20.004
0.132**
0.006
20.059
20.111
0.146**
20.090
20.153

0.373
0.001
0.000
0.028
0.784
0.937
0.943
0.010
0.902
0.246
0.028
0.004
0.078
0.003

CAPSCUS Subscale
Reporting System
Response and Feedback
Safety Personnel
Accountability
Pilot Authority
Professionalism
Supervisor of Flight/Chief Flight Instructor
Dispatch
Instructors
Ground and Ramp Personnel
Safety Values
Safety Fundamentals
Going Beyond Compliance
Safety Behavior

Spearman r

Sig.

0.143**
0.249**
0.269**
0.147**
0.038
20.035
0.090
0.208**
0.080
0.030
20.028
0.359**
20.016
20.025

0.003
0.000
0.000
0.003
0.450
0.117
0.076
0.000
0.115
0.552
0.583
0.000
0.759
0.635

Note. **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; *correlation is significant
at the 0.05 level.

Note. **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.

Table 11
Safety Assurance Spearman r correlation coefficient.

Table 13
Overall SMS implementation Spearman r correlation coefficient.

CAPSCUS Subscale
Reporting System
Response and Feedback
Safety Personnel
Accountability
Pilot Authority
Professionalism
Supervisor of Flight/Chief Flight Instructor
Dispatch
Instructors
Ground and Ramp Personnel
Safety Values
Safety Fundamentals
Going Beyond Compliance
Safety Behavior

Spearman r

Sig.

0.162**
0.221**
0.226**
0.170**
0.066
0.013
0.063
0.216**
0.100*
0.034
20.021
0.345**
20.034
20.012

0.001
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.185
0.800
0.217
0.000
0.049
0.512
0.677
0.000
0.507
0.811

CAPSCUS Subscale
Reporting System
Response and Feedback
Safety Personnel
Accountability
Pilot Authority
Professionalism
Supervisor of Flight/Chief Flight Instructor
Dispatch
Instructors
Ground and Ramp Personnel
Safety Values
Safety Fundamentals
Going Beyond Compliance
Safety Behavior

Spearman r

Sig.

0.121*
0.239**
0.236**
0.140**
0.032
20.053
0.033
0.199**
0.041
20.014
20.069
0.310**
20.076
20.094

0.012
0.000
0.000
0.005
0.517
0.295
0.513
0.000
0.417
0.786
0.176
0.000
0.139
0.070

Note. **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; *correlation is significant
at the 0.05 level.

Note. **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; *correlation is significant
at the 0.05 level.

Within the Safety Promotion component, there were nine
variables found to be statistically significant. Many of the
variables were the same variables that were statistically significant in Safety Assurance: Reporting System, rs 5 0.143,
p 5 0.003; Response and Feedback, rs 5 0.249, p 5 0.000;
Safety Personnel, rs 5 0.269, p 5 0.000; Accountability,
rs 5 0.147, p 5 0.003; Dispatch, rs 5 0.208, p 5 0.000;
and Safety Fundamentals, rs 5 0.359, p 5 0.000.
Within the overall SMS implementation of the schools,
statistically significant results were found in the same
variables that were found within the Safety Promotion component: Reporting System, rs 5 0.121, p 5 0.012; Response
and Feedback, rs 5 0.239, p 5 0.000; Safety Personnel, rs 5
0.236, p 5 0.000; Accountability, rs 5 0.140, p 5 0.005;
Dispatch, rs 5 0.199, p 5 0.000; and Safety Fundamentals,
rs 5 0.310, p 5 0.000.
For every Spearman correlation that was conducted on
the SMS components and the total SMS implementation,

there were consistent statistically significant results. The
subscales within the Formal Safety major scale consistently
displayed a statistical significance to each SMS component.
Informal Safety had one subscale, Accountability, which
was consistently statistically significant. Operational Interaction had one scale, Dispatch, that was consistently statistically significant. The Instructor subscale had a statistically significant relationship with Safety Assurance. The
only subscale within Organizational Commitment that had
a statistical significant relationship with the SMS components was Safety Fundamentals.
At the end of the CAPSCUS the respondents were asked
about the university’s safety record. This section related to
each respondent’s perception regarding the probability of
the university experiencing an incident or an accident
over the next 12 months. This section was not considered a
major scale or a subscale regarding safety culture. However,
a Spearman r correlation was done to see if there was any
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Table 14
Management Commitment Spearman r correlation coefficient.
CAPSCUS Subscale
Reporting System
Response and Feedback
Safety Personnel
Accountability
Pilot Authority
Professionalism
Supervisor of Flight/Chief Flight Instructor
Dispatch
Instructors
Ground and Ramp Personnel
Safety Values
Safety Fundamentals
Going Beyond Compliance
Safety Behavior
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Table 15
CAPSCUS subscale Spearman r correlation coefficient.

Spearman r

Sig.

0.137**
0.280**
0.270**
0.147**
20.001
20.063
0.105*
0.227**
0.079
0.072
0.006
0.228**
0.007
20.073

0.004
0.000
0.000
0.003
0.992
0.218
0.039
0.000
0.118
0.159
0.906
0.000
0.889
0.160

CAPSCUS Subscale
Reporting System
Response and Feedback
Safety Personnel
Accountability
Pilot Authority
Professionalism
Supervisor of Flight/Chief Flight Instructor
Dispatch
Instructors
Ground and Ramp Personnel
Safety Values
Safety Fundamentals
Going Beyond Compliance
Safety Behavior

Spearman r

Sig.

0.060
0.188**
0.151**
0.085
0.005
20.025
0.039
0.127*
0.024
0.012
20.027
0.268**
20.077
20.022

0.219
0.000
0.002
0.086
0.917
0.620
0.446
0.012
0.630
0.810
0.595
0.000
0.132
0.679

Note. **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; *correlation is significant
at the 0.05 level.

Note. **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; *correlation is significant
at the 0.05 level.

relationship between SMS implementation and each respondent’s perception of the university’s safety record. The
results of the Spearman r correlation indicate that a
negative relationship exists between the components of
SMS and the total implementation. The Safety Risk
Management component (rs 5 20.146, p 5 0.005) and
the Safety Assurance component (rs 5 20.104, p 5
0.044) showed statistically significant weak negative
correlations with university safety record.
Management commitment was also correlated to the
subscale variables (Table 14). The number of items that the
safety officer selected on the SMS implementation survey
determined the level of management commitment. There
were five items that were included to determine the level:
invests in human resources and financial resources, proactive in preventing accidents, consistently enforces safety
procedures, views regulatory violations seriously, and
involved in safety activities. Each safety officer from every
school selected at least four of the five items. Correlation
was done based on those answers and the subscale variable.
Similar to the SMS components, weak relationships existed.
However, similar subscales were indicated as having a statistically significant relationship to management commitment: Reporting System, rs 5 0.137, p 5 0.004; Response
and Feedback, rs 5 0.280, p 5 0.000; Safety Personnel, rs 5
0.270, p 5 0.000; Accountability, rs 5 0.147, p 5 0.005;
Supervisor of Flight/Chief Flight Instructor, rs 5 0.105, p 5
0.039; Dispatch, rs 5 0.227, p 5 0.000; and Safety Fundamentals, rs 5 0.228, p 5 0.000.
To determine how consistent the responses were from
each school for each subscale, a Spearman r correlation
was conducted. All of the subscales showed a positive
relationship except for Professionalism, Safety Values,
Going Beyond Compliance, and Safety Behavior. Most
of the scales indicated a weak relationship with only four
showing a statistical significance. Those four were Response
and Feedback, rs 5 0.188, p 5 0.000; Safety Personnel,

rs 5 0.151, p 5 0.002; Dispatch, rs 5 0.127, p 5 0.012;
and Safety Fundamentals, rs 5 0.268, p 5 0.000. Table 15
displays the Spearman r relationship between the responses
to the various subscales and the schools.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between SMS implementation and safety culture at
collegiate flight schools. The approach for this study was to
see if there was a relationship with the level of SMS implementation, level of management commitment, and level of
safety promotion and safety culture. There are four major
scales within safety culture each having different subscales.
Various levels of SMS implementation and safety promotion existed among the different flight schools, while the
management commitment variable had less variability.
Conclusions
Research Question 1
The first research question was this: What is the relationship between SMS implementation and safety culture at
collegiate flight schools? There was a positive relationship
between SMS implementation and all of subscales within
the Formal Safety Program major scale of safety culture.
All four components except for Safety Risk Management
had a positive statistically significant relationship with the
three subscales within this major scale. Reporting System
did not indicate a statistical significance with Safety Risk
Management.
SMS is defined as a ‘‘the formal, top-down, organization-wide approach to managing safety risk and assuring
the effectiveness of safety risk controls. It includes systematic procedures, practices, and policies for the management of safety risk’’ (FAA, 2015a). The formal organized
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approach to managing safety that comes from SMS
implementation seems to have an impact on the Formal
Safety Program aspects of safety culture. The subscales
Reporting System and Response and Feedback are linked
to reporting culture and informed culture. Another aspect of
reporting culture would be how many reports are filed at an
individual institution. The majority of the respondents had
never submitted a hazard report. The reporting results of
this study were similar to those of Freiwald et al. (2013)
and Adjekum et al. (2015) which suggested that generally
the respondents thought that safety reporting systems were
important but they did not participate in the safety reporting
system at their organization. The relationship between
Response and Feedback and SMS implementation suggests
similar findings to those reported by Adjekum et al. (2015)
in that when there is effective feedback on safety issues,
a positive perception of safety culture is the result.
The Informal Safety Program had only one subscale,
Accountability, that had a statistically significant positive
relationship with every component except for Safety
Policy. Accountability is linked to a just culture, which is
an important aspect of achieving a strong safety culture.
Operations Interaction had one subscale, Dispatch, that
was positively correlated with all four components. This
result is similar to those of Adjekum (2013) that found that
was a ‘‘good perception of the professional role of dispatch,
which seem to have an effect on their authority to make
informed and safe decisions on flight issues’’ (p. 111). The
Instructor subscale had a relationship to Safety Assurance
as well. This major scale takes into account the perception
of how concerned they (dispatch, instructors, etc.) are for
safety and their involvement in safety at the organization.
Safety Fundamentals was the only subscale within the
major scale of Organizational Commitment that had a relationship to SMS implementation. Safety Fundamentals refers
to the leadership’s compliance with regulatory aspects of
safety. This subscale may tend to have a positive relationship
because SMS is not required for collegiate flight schools;
therefore if a flight school is pursuing SMS they are probably
meeting regulatory compliance in other areas.
Safety Behavior is not a major scale; however, behavior
is an important aspect of safety culture. There was a negative relationship between Safety Behavior and every SMS
component. However, none were statistically significant.
It is unclear from this study as to why this negative relationship existed. One reason could be that within an
organization that has a strong reporting culture and just
culture, people feel more comfortable reporting their errors
as well as the errors of others.
McNeely (2012) found that the implementation of SMS
influences the safety culture of an organization in a positive
way. Similar to McNeely, the results of this study indicate
that there is a positive relationship between SMS implementation and safety culture within every major scale but
more specifically the Formal Safety Program scale.

Research Question 2
The second research question was the following: What is
the relationship between the level of promotion and the
safety culture at collegiate flight schools? This question
parallels question one, as Safety Promotion is a major
component within SMS. Safety Promotion has a strong link
to every other component within SMS. Similar to question
one, the results of this study indicated a positive relationship between Safety Promotion and safety culture. The
more promotion that is done within an organization the
stronger is the safety culture for the Formal Safety Program
major scale. All of the subscales within this major scale had
a positive relationship with safety promotion.
The Informal Safety Program had only one subscale,
Accountability, that had a statistically significant positive
relationship with Safety Promotion. As previously mentioned, Operations Interaction had one subscale, Dispatch,
that was positively correlated with Safety Promotion. Safety
Fundamentals was the only subscale within the major scale
of Organizational Commitment that had a relationship to
Safety Promotion. The safety manager from each institution
answered a question rating the level of promotion on a scale
from 0 to 10. The responses from this question were not
included in the analysis due to their being only one individual’s opinion as to the rating of promotion. However, the
ratings that the safety officer gave for promotion seemed to
parallel the statistical relationship with SMS implementation
that was found for each school.
Research Question 3
The third research question was the following: What is
the relationship between the level of management commitment and safety culture at collegiate flight schools? The
relationship between management commitment and safety
culture was similar to the previous two research questions.
All of the subscales within Formal Safety Program were
positive and significant, as well as Accountability, Dispatch, and Safety Fundamentals. There was an additional
subscale that had a significant and positive relationship,
which was Supervisor of Flight/Chief Flight Instructor.
Chief flight instructors in most flight training organizations
are considered management. If there is more management
commitment to SMS implementation, then the Operation
Interaction of the Chief Flight Instructor would be perceived more positive by the respondents. The safety manager
from each institution answered a question rating the level
of management commitment on a scale from 0 to 10. The
responses from this question were not included in the
analysis due to their being only one individual’s opinion
as to the rating of management commitment. However,
the ratings that the safety officer gave for management
commitment seemed to parallel the level of SMS implementation that was found for each school.
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